Bank Debt Spiral

The zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) will kill the banks. Falling interest rates help banks by increasing the value of their bond and loan portfolios. This is the well understood inverse relationship between discount rate and present value of a future sum. But you see keeping interest rates at zero does virtually nothing for the banks as rates cannot fall further. There is a short window where ZIRP is a positive but an "extended period" (in Fedspeak) is just slow death for the banks.

During that short period, the banks are still collecting on portfolios constructed when rates were higher but as those higher-yielding assets mature, there is nothing comparable to replace them. We hear constantly how banks can just borrow at zero and invest in Treasuries - pocketing the difference. That would be fine if yields on Treasury debt were not low and falling along with everything else. The other problem is that this simplistic formula assumes that banks' operating expenses are negligible. Both unstated assumptions fail any sort of reality check.

Back in the real world, T-bills yield virtually nothing. The 2-year note is now at 50 basis points as of today. The 5-year is at 1.43% and the 10-year at 2.68%. Assuming zero borrowing cost (which is overly generous), net interest is equal to gross interest. Large banks generally require a net interest spread of more than 2% to cover their expenses, so they will lose money even buying 5-year Treasuries. If they invest their entire portfolio in 10-year notes, they'll make about a 50 basis point spread on assets pre-tax. But the 10 years is a lot of risk in terms of time for rates to change and also a long time to tie up the money. And banks care BARELY eke out a profit by taking this extreme level of maturity risk. There is a reason why you never see loan portfolios with 10 year average maturities.

For those advocates who think banks can rebuild their balance sheets by buying Treasuries, you might ultimately be correct but there are so many things that can go wrong with that scenario. First consider the size of the hole in bank balance sheets. Recent activity at the FDIC suggests that many troubled banks are overstating the value of their assets by 30% or more - that is the average size of the hit when the FDIC takes them over. At a rebuild rate of 50 basis points annually (with a lot of risk) it would take a literal lifetime to repair the balance sheets via this strategy. It was much easier in the early 1990s when rates for the 10-year started at 9% and never went below 5.5%. There was plenty of room to generate capital gains on bank bond portfolios wit falling rates and still leave a reasonable current yield at the end. Anybody using that era as a template for bank recovery is going to be sorely disappointed. Does anybody still wonder why Japan is trapped despite 20 years of ZIRP?

All of this assumes that ZIRP is sustainable over decades and that the financial system is sufficiently stable to endure the pressure over the long term. Neither one is proven and the ability to fund the debt implied by ZIRP is particularly shaky. If it works, it will take 60 years As one one of our favorite bloggers Karl Denninger says "the math is never wrong."

Fractional Naked Shorting

Every dollar-denominated loan can be viewed functionally as a partial naked short position in FRNs (Federal Reserve Notes, 1.e. cash). The extent of the naked short is the inverse of the reserve ratio, so at 10% reserve, the position is written as 90% naked short. The entry is created where the bank shorts notional dollars into existence where none existed before. The Fed is a mechanism for supporting those naked shorts against margin calls that would otherwise happen in the real world - that's what a bank run really is, a margin call by lenders (depositors).

The continued existence of this naked shorting depends utterly on the willingness of the lenders to accept repayment in virtual instead of real dollars. Wire transfers, checks and book entries are all dollar substitutes, not actual dollars. An entire massive infrastructure has been erected to push people towards the conclusion that these are actually identical to FRNs. Banks will freely exchange your book entry with them for cash - until they can't anymore. The FDIC exists to guarantee that you will get cash for that book entry or other cash substitute. The Fed holds stocks of FRNs which it can exchange on a limited basis to commercial banks in danger of running out.

The scale of the pyramid scheme can be measured by the ratio of actual cash to virtual cash. Total cash in circulation (real cash) is $923 billion per the H.4.1 release dated December 10. The amount of virtual cash is the total credit outstanding, which is $52.6 TRILLION as of September 30 per the Z.1 release also dated December 10. In other words, each one dollar of cash is supporting nearly 57 dollars of credit. Through the mechanism of this gigantic naked short position, the value of the underlying security - the US dollar has been driven down to a huge extent. In fact, the short ratio can also be expressed as 98%. Not coincidentally, that is also the extent to which the US dollar's purchasing power has been reduced since the advent of the Federal Reserve.

This gives you some idea of the extent to which the value of the supply of dollars has been diluted by all of the substitutes that have been introduced into the system. If the dollar were a drug, it would be so heavily cut as to have no discernible effect. It also explains the desperation with which the financial world is attempting to save "the system" - by which they mean the machine that issues dollar substitutes and convinces you to accept them. There are sufficient dollars to cover less than 2% of domestic debt outstanding. That takes no account of the naked short positions of foreign banks. The bankers are short 57 dollars for each dollar that actually exists. You can well imagine what would happen if such a short position were to be squeezed to any significant extent.

One can justify banking to the extent than it increases productive capacity and therefore ultimately wealth. The increase in the pool of dollar substitutes will have minimal inflationary impact as that growth will be counter-balanced by an increase in the pool of goods those dollars can buy. This is a social good and one of the few philosophical reasons to support banking. Of course we are long past the point at which such banking was the norm, or even a large minority of credit activity.

The FDIC and You

Well friends it's time to talk about bank failures and wealth preservation. We have talked about insolvent banks on multiple occasions before but the threat of large banks failing is now imminent. Countrywide was saved from such a fate by Bank of America. Now IndyMac is right on the edge. They're not officially dead yet - only mostly dead but there's no Miracle Max in sight.

Their recent letter to stakeholders reads like a death certificate:

• regulators involved
• prohibited from getting brokered deposits
• can't sell stock (no buyers)
• asset sales would deplete capital (tacit admission of mis-valuation)
• ===> must stop making loans

The FDIC has been bulking up for months now, anticipating a wave of bank failures. So far it's been a few small banks but now it's the big boy's turn. So how secure are bank deposits and and how much can the insurance fund really cover? For now, it looks like the answers are pretty safe (as long as you're under the $100,000 limit) and a pretty good amount as they have $54.5 billion in the fund as of the March 31 report.

The report contains further indications that they see the problem as serious and imminent. For instance, last March the fund held $3.7 billion in cash, going to $4.0 billion in December and $8.0 billion this March. Clearly they are raising cash in anticipation of something. There is a similar pattern to the provision for losses from negative last March to $95 million in December and $525 million the March. Interestingly, that last number is about 2.5x the estimated losses on ALL failed banks YTD.

$5.6 million - Douglass National

$214 million - ANB Financial

$2.3 million - First Integrity

ANB is almost the entire amount but was not shut down until May. The FDIC was already anticipating a lot more at the end of March. It will be fascinating to see what kind of provisions they made at the end of June. We should have that report in approximately 2 weeks. The banks that have failed so far have cost the FDIC about 10% of deposits to make the depositors whole. This suggests that the regulators were planning on banks with another $3 billion in deposits going bad as of 4 months ago but IndyMac alone is much larger than that.

So what kind of impact should we expect if the FDIC has to liquidate a large part of their portfolio to make good on their guarantees? Personally, we're expecting a bear steepening of the yield curve but have a look at the composition for yourself:

There is a big slug of bonds maturing in 2009 so if FDIC is forced to liquidate, the pressure should be strongest on the 2-year and shorter Treasury market. Given the amount of cash, it would take a significant failure to force them to liquidate much before the maturity dates but we want to start thinking about the possibility and the implications of such an event.