The Visible Fist

The Visible Fist of government that is. The Visible Fist is about to crush the property market in China, exploding one of the most egregious bubbles on the face of the planet. The specific blow will take the form of imposing a property tax nationwide - in guidelines recently approved by the State Council. It was reported earlier this week in China Daily.

Although the measures have been considered for some time, the recent push has been given urgency by the dangerous levels that China's property bubble has reached. One of the key contributing factors has been the number of speculators buying property and then holding it off the market to profit from the price run up. Morgan Stanley's Andy Xie estimates that such properties number in the 10-20 million unit range.

Some of his other comments portray a China going through the same stages of economic madness that the US has over the last 20 years. But China is passing through each stage much faster as the (well-deserved) lack of trust in their financial system causes people to only chase really big potential profits. Look at this paragraph and tell me you don't see the parallels:

China's policies have travelled the path of least immediate resistance - monetary expansion and asset inflation. The main purpose behind asset inflation is that the government can tax it. It provides a place for people to chase their get-rich-quick dreams and is popular as long as the market goes up. It also offers insiders who have disproportionate influence to play the game at the expense of little people. It is no coincidence that China's policies have been so pro-asset-inflation in the past few years.

His comments seem to suggest that the lack of a property tax was a deliberate strategy to encourage land speculation and bid up prices in a frenzy. This would make sense as the state was by far the biggest landowner and wanted to extract the maximum price for it. With a large amount of land now in private hands, it can be taxed as the taxable base can now replace diminished land sales as a source of government revenue.

Increasing the carrying cost of speculative assets is one of the surest ways to burst a bubble. That is why rising interest rates nearly always do the trick. Rising ownership taxes have the same impact. China is doing both. The government is both instituting a property tax and requiring higher interest rates on properties other than a primary residence. The impact has been dramatic and nearly immediate and so far, it's just the new financial rules and property restrictions. The tax will aggravate the impact. Here is a report from two weeks ago in China Daily:

The Shanghai market has already felt the chill of the tightening housing policies with new apartment sales falling in April. Over 13,185 units of newly built apartments were traded in April, down 43.7 percent from the same period in 2009, according to data from China Real Estate Index System Shanghai.

Trading in the secondary market in Shanghai also saw a dramatic slump since April 16.

A total of 13,865 housing units changed hands between April 1 to 16, but only 7,974 units were traded from April 17 to 30, said Ma Ji, consulting manager at property consultancy Shanghai Centaline China.

Local media also reported that a property tax might be imposed in the next few months. Houses that fall into the definition for charging property tax will be levied an annual fee of as much as 8 percent of the apartment's total value, the Shanghai Securities News reported on Wednesday.

While I applaud the Chinese government's belated return to sanity, they are now being forced to take action to rein in the monster they created. Recall that we criticized the massive push to force credit through the system last year in Command and Control and The Price of Ponzi. The Sinophiles bragged about how smart the Chinese government was and how the money was going into useful projects. They completely forgot (or never learned) that money is fungible and much of it was bound to end up wasted in financial speculation in stocks and real estate.


Implications
China is trapped in a massive inflationary spiral of its own making. Wages are rising rapidly - undermining their major competitive advantage. But the average worker is still falling behind in terms of housing and other necessities. Just as in the US during the 1970s, inflation's initial effect is seen a purely positive - a feeling of rising prosperity that seems costless. China went through that over the last 18 months and it's time to pay the piper. It is going to be impossible to tame short of crashing their economy to subdue the fundamental labor supply picture, crash the RE market to increase purchasing power in terms of land or crash the stock market through contraction of the overall money supply. I expect more than one will be needed and likely all three will happen when they try to trigger any one readjustment.

One final comment. The divergence between Chinese consumer inflation and US CPI dis-inflation is strong supporting evidence for the Austrian and Monetarist schools view of the matter. Both consider inflation to be a matter of increasing amounts of money (really credit). Private credit is tanking in the US and has been for some time while China forced their banks to lend massively more.

Command and Control?

Much is made of the rebound in China's 2nd quarter GDP and the drivers certainly merit a closer look. We are going to focus on just one key metric today - credit. In an effort to reach escape velocity from the global collapse, China has ordered its banks to make lots of loans and the banks have complied. So just how much lending has occurred and what is the scale of the likely impact. Let's look at the numbers, shall we? Various sources have reported the lending numbers and this article from the Globe and Mail is typical:

Chinese banks lent 1.5 trillion yuan ($220-billion U.S.) in June, the central bank reported on its Web site Wednesday. That exceeded forecasts and was up from May's 665 billion yuan ($97-billion) in lending and April's 590 billion yuan ($86-billion).

Keep in mind that the entire Chinese economy was approximately 30 trillion yuan in 2008. Another way to look at things is that China's economic output is roughly 2.5 trillion yuan per month and in June bank lending was equal to 60% of that output. One might safely say that credit expansion on that scale might have some impact on the economy. Keep in mind, this does NOT include bond issuance by corporations, the government in Beijing or the provincial and local governments; but the amount is enormous even without them. For perspective, the Flow of Funds shows total non-financial debt added in the US economy during 2006, the last full year of the UDB was $2.41 trillion in a $13.4 trillion economy - so borrowing was 18% of GDP in an extreme environment. Maybe this was just an aberration of one month? After all April and May were much lower. Well, let's look further down in the article:

The latest figure would push total bank lending for the first half of the year to 7.3 trillion yuan (just under $1.1-trillion).

So monthly loans averaged over 1.2 trillion yuan and June was more typical than the prior months. Interestingly, CNBC reports that Beijing's minimum bank lending target for all of 2009 is 5 trillion yuan and the banks have already exceed that number by 46% in just six months. Having established that the lending spree is enormous, the other key question is how much of a change it represents. For that, we will take words straight from the horse's mouth - a PBOC press release:

At end-June, outstanding RMB loans reached RMB 37.74 trillion, up 34.44% year on year, accelerating by 15.71 percentage points year on year and by 3.83 percentage points month on month. In the first half of the year, RMB loans increased by RMB 7.37 trillion, up RMB 4.92 trillion year on year.

Total debt grew 34.4%, while lending TRIPLED from 2.45 trillion to 7.37 trillion yuan year over year. Are the mental alarms going off yet? Again we will refer to the Flow of Funds for perspective. During the peak of the US housing bubble, mortgage lending took 6 years to triple from the trough in 1995. Yet China has compressed the impact of a historic multi-year bubble into 12 months. There also has to be dramatic deterioration in credit quality. There is no realistic way to triple lending without severely compromising lending standards - as we saw so dramatically with liar loans, nothing down, NINJA lending and option ARMs. Does anyone doubt that something comparable or worse is happening in China now?

The game plan for China should be obvious by now. They are following the path of every other participant in the UDB with a vengeance. Tripling lending until it reaches nearly half of GDP for the first half is the real stimulus in China. By contrast the US Federal government borrowing 14% of GDP looks downright conservative. China is attempting to reinflate their bubble economy but even if they "succeed" the price will be hideous. The price of failure is nearly unthinkable.

The Price of Ponzi

Faking Bank
First let's be clear that prices for the majority of asset classes around the world are unsustainably high. This is an obvious corollary to the very inflated state of the global financial system and economy due to the excessive leverage that we have commented upon many times. It bears repeating that central banks (CBs) have little actual power, they merely serve as rallying points and fetish-totems for optimistic, true-believing speculators. The evidence is quite clear that CBs often fail to accomplish their goals, in recent cases despite extraordinary actions to "inspire confidence" - i.e. reignite speculation.

If the CBs were as powerful as most think, they could not possibly fail to accomplish their goals. Like voodoo, it is the BELIEF of the victim that causes the damage - a negative application of the well-documented placebo effect. While they have succeeded in restarting speculation to some extent in equities and commodities, they have utterly failed to do so in most of the securitization and especially the re-securitization markets. Other than the Fed itself, there is very little demand for MBS and ABS. CDOs have fallen flat on their face and can't get up. The investment bankers' efforts to re-securitize garbage and get it rated as AAA again have largely met with derision. Assets in the real economy are seeing no increase in demand at all to this point. Housing, commercial RE, private businesses, capital equipment and others are all in the doldrums with hardly any positives even in the second derivative.


Flee(t)ing Confidence
Take note of which asset classes are seeing speculation and which are not. It is only those that can be sold instantly with a mouse click that are getting any action - equities and commodities which trade as futures on an exchange. The exceptions are revealing. Iron ore, which requires long-term contracts instead of futures isn't going up and in fact is going down, with users essentially buying at spot by refusing to commit to L-T deals. Assets that are theoretically liquid but actually trade by appointment only are seeing little help. This would include the aforementioned MBS and ABS. Those that require a real commitment and have payback periods measured in years continue to crater. Basically, the only confidence at this time is the confidence of the daytrader.

Yet we now see speculation among economists that there could be a return to growth in the next four quarters and actually, it's hard to disagree that such a thing is technically possible. The key here is the massive amount of deficit spending by governments around the world. Official US Treasury estimates place the FY 2009 deficit at $1.8 trillion but $2 trillion is more likely. The DEFICIT will likely represent 14% of GDP this year. China is in a similar situation, with a "stimulus" package of nearly $600 billion in a $4.4 trillion dollar economy - which works out to just under 14% of GDP. Hmm, that number sounds familiar.

Large segments of both economies are ponzi schemes, though China's most vulnerable sectors are both larger and more leveraged relatively speaking. In the US, the most affected sector is finance; in China, construction and fixed investment. Consider for a moment that both governments are spending enormous sums of money they don't have - effectively borrowing it from the future to spend now. Once again hoping to ignite a chain reaction of speculation and a new bubble.

We actually expect a slight positive print in US GDP in early 2010, with a larger collapse to follow as soon as the government can no longer borrow cheaply. This is the inevitable result of spending twice your income (tax revenue) just to keep the current illusion alive. When the bond market cuts off this foolishness, the portion of the economy that is unsustainable without a bubble dies and all of the capital spent to keep it alive dies with it - a complete waste. Instead of a mere depression, we have a depression compounded with the destruction of capital that should have been preserved to start rebuilding afterwards.


Pricing Ponzi
If you think about it, both the US and China are expending one-seventh of their respective GDPs to support a lie. Another way to think of it is the rate of return the market (in the form of speculators) demands to continue to invest in the ponzi schemes. In effect, the government's best guess at the required RoR is 14%. Antal Fekete has written about the falling marginal productivity of debt. In other words, the debt-based ponzi scheme is becoming less and less effective. As a result the sponsor of the scheme (governments) are having to increase the amount pumped into the bubble to keep the speculators in and prevent a UNIVERSAL recognition of the failure that has already occurred. This is typical of late-stage ponzi schemes where a critical mass of investors become suspicious and demand their money. The sponsor has to come up with it somewhere and in this case they can conveniently pledge their citizens' future income (taxes) as collateral for more loans.

It is impossible to calculate the precise cost but we can look at deficit and "stimulus" spending as a good first approximation of the price to keep the ponzi scheme rolling. If 14% of GDP can be spent and not even produce a single quarter of positive numbers then the decay is even larger and more advanced than we have previously postulated. As an example, the latest Personal Income Report from the BEA showed the scale of government attempts to manipulate the economy. Wages dropped sharply but personal income rose 1.4%. The money quotes:

Private wage and salary disbursements decreased $12.4 billion in May, compared with a decrease of $0.7 billion in April.

Personal current transfer receipts increased $162.6 billion in May, compared with an increase of $59.1 billion in April. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provides for one-time payments of $250 to eligible individuals receiving social security, supplemental security income, veterans benefits, and railroad retirement benefits. These benefits boosted the level of personal current transfer receipts by $157.6 billions at an annual rate in May.

Once the long-end of the Treasury yield curve resumes its upward march, the financing will get more difficult. If short-term money ever becomes expensive for the US government then the deception is over. But for right now we may get further upticks in optimism as long as the government can continue to create doubt and obscure the real state of the economy. In the near term, it's all in the hands of the speculators and their mood swings and isn't that a sad commentary on the state of the world.

Asian Flu

In the past few days we have received confirmation that our thesis regarding Asia is playing out rapidly. The data come from Japan and Korea - both heavily industrialized exporters and relatively open societies. While we have been very bearish on Asian economies here at Financial Jenga, the rapid pace of the implosion even surprises us.

Japan will soon report 4th quarter GDP and the estimates are moving fast - an in a really frightening manner. Bloomberg reports that Barclays now is estimating that Japan's economy contracted at over 12% annualized in Q4. This would be the worst result since the Arab oil embargo of 1974. Korea reported a similarly disastrous result for November industrial production. The YoY decline of 14.1% was the worst on record - with data going back to 1970. Understand that the textbook definition of depression is a 10% fall in GDP - and both Japan and Korea are already on pace to do so in a year or less.

We do not yet have any numbers this bad from China but we should not expect to see them for some time. China's economy possessed tremendous momentum entering the current crisis and that will have to bleed off before the damage becomes apparent on a macro scale. Also, China's government is still rather secretive and probably will attempt to hide the extent of the declines. However, we are getting industrial production numbers showing that December was the fifth straight month of decline.

Once again, Bloomberg reports that industrial output is slowing and the pace of layoff is increasing. The problem is that order also continue to fall so this is not an inventory correction as the head of the People's Bank of China would suggest. This is a collapse of end demand driven by credit. The demand is nearly all external so China has no control over that. Since China's end consumer demand is small and even most of that is tied to export industries in some way, there really isn't any way out for them. The most fascinating quote from that article follows:

China’s economic growth may have slipped to 5.5 percent last quarter, the weakest pace in at least 15 years, according to Shanghai-based Industrial Bank Co.

Once again, numbers that would have seemed shocking a short time ago are now the expected. China will be fortunate indeed if their GDP continues to grow at all in the near future.

Submerging Market Update

note: This post was begun some time ago and the date-time stamp reflects the initial draft. The bulk of the data has been added since then.


China: The Collapse Begins
Chinese exports are collapsing and industrial activity with it. Recent reports suggest that they are experiencing mass factory shutdowns with owners and manager absconding. According to the BBC, migrant workers from rural areas are returning to their homes in the countryside en masse. Those watching the media would think that an shocking collapse came out of nowhere in the last few weeks. Readers of Financial Jenga have known that this was not just possible but virtually inevitable for many months.

China could spend some of their dollars but they need to keep at least $1 trillion so the Yuan doesn't completely crash and burn. The interesting problem is the currency mismatch and "sterilization" issues. China's money supply growth is going to fall quickly as there will be fewer incoming dollars against which to issue new Yuan. Yes they will also be exporting fewer dollars to pay for raw materials but that doesn't matter to the unemployed citizens.

The mismatch issue is more critical. Everybody likes to talk about China's currency reserves. The problem is they've already been used up. Yes, they still have the dollars at the central bank but they've already issued Yuan against them as part of their "sterilization" operations. I.e. they cannot use the reserves to "stimulate" the domestic economy. They can SPEND them abroad, which will enable China to consume but will add production elsewhere, doing nothing for the production side of the Chinese economy. The mismatch problem is that they need more Yuan but what they have are Dollars. Much of the existing base of Yuan supply only exists because of the Dollar reserves. If they spend down the reserves, they either have to reduce their domestic money supply or simply print more money to make up the difference.

People like to point to China's dollar reserves but they've already had as much stimulative impact on China's economy as they ever will. Note that the Yuan is NOT a convertible currency. There is no large pool of Yuan outside of China that could be exchanged for dollars and spent in the domestic economy. Nor can they be lent out with the understanding that the loan be spent on Chinese goods (vendor financing). They have already done that indirectly by purchasing Treasury and Agency debt. Those looking for such an impact don't understand the structure of China's financial system.


Latin Cognates
Despite a vicious snapback, the trend is quite clearly down. Likely driven in part by the Fed's dollar swaps, these markets found support last week but it looks like a dead cat bounce. During that week a rally in their sovereign bonds of 200 basis points +/- 10 bp, left Mexico and Brazil debt trading 8.55% and 7.58% respectively. What this tell us is that the threat of immediate default has been averted by Fed imprudence but no one is willing to lend at anything less than a huge multiple of the 100 bp spreads we saw only a year and a half ago.

Latin economies are heavily dependent on natural resource extration. Thus they have had and continue to have a symbiotic relationship with the resource-eating black hole known as China. With consumption slowing worldwide and the initial feedback effects on the exporting countries, we are starting to see resource demand falling but the excess capacity created is collapsing commodity prices. The storm of demand destruction is roaring up the supply chain and spawning tornados that tear through individual sectors. The latest example comes from Brazil, where giant mining conglomerate Vale do Rio Doce is desperately cutting spending. The big news is the cancellation of 12 giant ore carriers - which would have been built in new Chinese shipyards. At the same time, they are cutting ore production as demand falls.

An intersting question is how much demand for their own ore Vale just destroyed by cancelling the ship order. This is a vicious circle as the feedback loop in the symbiotic relationship turns negative. Rising expectations and optimism feed off themselves - until they don't anymore. Then ugliness always ensues. In this case the fall will be long and ugly - like that of Icarus, who flew too close to the sun. We have dubbed it the Universal Debt bubble as virtually every country and every industry was caught up in it. Countries like Brazil and China were some of the biggest beneficiaries of the UDB, yet those who advocated the Decoupling Theory essentially argued that the biggest beneficiaries of a trend would be hurt little if at all when it ended. The silliness of THAT position is now manifest for all to see.

Containment Breach
We've heard many times how the crisis would be "contained" to a specific industry or geographic region. The authorities making these countless claims were either lying, incompetent or both. We see now that it is and was global and across the board - thus UDB is very accurate. While we expect exporters and raw materials producers to suffer worse than most, the damage goes on elsewhere. German factory orders fell 8%. US durable goods spending fell 14.1% in the 3Q GDP report. Japanese auto sales have hit levels not seen since the 1970s, while US sales are Back to the Future of the 1980s. This is global and ugly friends. Please protect yourselves.

Some Key Questions

The most important question facing us today, both in the US and around the world is just how much of our supposed wealth is real and how much was part of the illusion generated by bubble-mania and the UDB. Most of the actions of various governments and CBs seem aimed at preventing us from answering this question accurately. In The Limits of Optimism we outlined the various elements of the capital structure and it should be immediately apparent why the stock market is the chosen instrument for conjuring chimeras. By coercing a larger and larger percentage of accumulated capital into stocks, Wall Street ensured a large pool of buyers to continue pushing prices higher in complete defiance of fundamentals. By allowing so much of our wealth accumulation to be attached to something so insubstantial, we have collectively ensured the destruction of much of that wealth. Something that falls as soon as anyone wants to sell isn't much of an investment.

Now we see some of the real world impacts of aggressively tying ourselves to the stock market. Once again, the secondary feedback effects may be greater than the primary impact. According to the WSJ:

At the end of 2007, companies in the S&P 500 had a combined pension-plan surplus of about $60 billion, The market selloff in the nine months to late September turned that into a combined deficit of about $75 billion...

Of course that was before October even started and we all know that things didn't go so well during that month either. Double digit declines were the rule for the month - pretty much across the board. The pension obligation and attempt to meet it by speculating in the stock market are yet another example of companies tying their fortunes directly to stock market whims rather than fundamental performance. It worked well for a while - allowing them to report higher profits than justified by actual results as speculative profits allowed them to pay less into the pension funds than a sensible and stable plan would have required. The reverse is now occurring and it's going to be nasty. This is yet ANOTHER headwind for corporate profits as they are forced to pay cash in to make up for speculative losses.

The lesson that should be learned here is "don't gamble with retirement money" but I fear few will choose to learn it until all other avenues have been exhausted. People can usually be counted on to do the right thing after all else fails.


Confirmed Reservations
Occasionally, I will encounter a supercilious restaurant host who will haughtily ask if we have reservations. When the right mood strikes the answer will sometimes be "yes, but we're planning on eating here anyway." In much the same vein, our prior reservations about the export economies and China in particular have been confirmed with a vengeance recently. Reuters reports that China's PMI hit 44.6 in October - indicating clear and serious contraction in factory output. This now makes three of the last four months down. In addition, recent BBC reports suggest that half of the toy factories in China have shut down since the start of the year.

Keep in mind that we expect a crash and burn in China's economy even if exports stagnate, much less roll over. Government action can partially ameliorate this but only to a small extent. We laid out the full case four months ago in China Syndrome. All of the elements preliminary requirements have now been met for this scenario to play out. The US is desperately trying to prevent a meltdown across the submerging markets with swap lines to exchange valuable dollars for garbage currencies like the Mexican Peso and the Brazilian Real. The temporary availability of dollars in those imploding economies has relieved the pressure from capital flight for the moment and perhaps even caused a small short squeeze for those who were looking for reality to catch up to those nations' financial system. But the banking systems overseas cannot sustain their credit expansion in the face of falling external demand and especially the collapse of primary commodity prices on which their economies rely heavily.

UDB meltdown

We have often spoken of the UDB (Universal Debt Bubble) and how it had permeated nearly every asset class and geography. It's existence is the reason that we have often chided believers in economic "decoupling" as fantasists. We wrote about the structural weaknesses of the Asian economies in China Syndrome and Silent Scream. The trend has been quite clear lately as India teeters on the edge of recession and Japan's trade surplus collapses. Today we receive additional confirmation (as if any were needed).

The last bastion of the "decoupling" fantasy is China. Yes OPEC and Russia can remain strong as long as oil prices stay high but that scenario rests on the further assumption of nearly unlimited demand growth out of Asia (especially China). Chinese growth had continued to be high even as it trended down for 5 consecutive quarters. Now we see a report that the industrial sector is SHRINKING outright over there. Bloomberg reports that Chinese PMI fell to 48.4 in July (anything below 50 indicates contraction). Naturally, there will be apologists who will blame the entire decline on the Olympics and the shutdown of industry in the Beijing area. I present for their edification import orders:

The output index fell to 47.4 in July from 54.2 in June, while the index of new orders dropped to 46.2 from 52.6. The index of export orders declined to 46.7 from 50.2.

Clearly, there is no correlation between demand for exports and the Olympics. While that is likely and aggravating factor, it's a long way from the heart of the problem. Exports are the be-all and end-all for China's economy and they are going down in no uncertain terms. This should be no surprise as the end demand in their trade partners is clearly weakening. This is horrible news for China, as their entire economy is a pyramid leveraged to exports. What we wrote in China Syndrome less than a month ago has particular resonance given this report:

Essentially, everything will be fine as long as everyone there believes the economy will continue to expand at a breakneck pace and invests accordingly. This is virtually the definition of a pyramid scheme.
...

The most likely trigger for a fall in China's capex is weakening exports. They don't even have to stagnate to trigger real problems, much less fall. When the current investment pattern is predicated on rapid and continuous growth, material decline in the growth rate should be sufficient to kick off lower capital spending. An event the magnitude of 1980 would cause a direct hit of 12% of GDP in China in addition to any multiplier effects and that is hardly unthinkable. Keep in mind that exports themselves account for 33% of Chinese GDP so any outright decline there would be a real problem for them - likely triggering a minimum 20% fall of GDP. Frankly it will be difficult for them to avoid it given the economic and political climate in their trading partners.

China is simply following the same pattern that we have already seen in India. In China's case, the slowing of demand may have been masked by the massive construction projects and inventory building prior to the Olympics. In many ways, this event is similar to the Y2K phenomenon that marked the top of the tech bubble. It is a date-certain occurrence which inspired massive spending and investment as well as hoarding and stockpiling (for different reasons). That date also marks the absolute cutoff of all related investment and spending as well as a potential inventory draw down. In this instance, the cycle is exacerbated by the reduction or cessation of industrial activity in and around Beijing. So instead of a gradual reduction in industrial production growth like India, China looks to be set for a sudden end to growth.

We see problems globally, not just in the US and Asia. Deflating housing bubbles in Spain, the UK, Italy and Australia. Retail sales falling across the developed world, with their supplier nations beginning to follow suit. This is no ordinary credit crisis. It is the beginning of the end for the largest and most extensive credit bubble in all of human history - the Universal Debt Bubble. No nation, no asset class will escape the effect of the bubble bursting. Preserve your wealth, reduce risk and get ready to buy assets on the cheap on the other side of this mess.

China Syndrome

Today we turn our attention to China - certainly the most celebrated economy in the world today and possibly the most celebrated ever. Yet China's contemporary economy may be the most unbalanced in the history of the planet.


The Problem
Though it is hard to find reliable numbers, most sources agree that capital investment in China accounts for over 40% of GDP. Frankly, this is a terrifying and unprecedented number. For reference, Japan during their boom years was typically around 30% of GDP and never exceeded 35% for long. During the Roaring Twenties, fixed investment in the US economy averaged less than 20%. Looked at a bit differently, about 42% of China's economy is based on ------ the expansion of the economy. This creates tremendous momentum but also huge potential for disaster. Essentially, everything will be fine as long as everyone there believes the economy will continue to expand at a breakneck pace and invests accordingly. This is virtually the definition of a pyramid scheme. Does anybody see anything wrong with this picture? Does this perhaps sound familiar? It should since the psychology is the same as every bubble in history.

So what could go wrong and how would it likely play out? I'm going to use post-war US recessions since that is an example most readers can relate to and gauge the seriousness. In reality, the US economy is relatively stable and mature so I would expect volatility to be much higher in China, not to mention the bubble nature of current investment levels. During its post-war recessions, US capital spending declined between 10% and 30% - with the extreme value being achieved in the 1980-82 period. This is simply the impact of over-investment during the preceding boom and the sudden realization of that fact and the resulting over-capacity during the recession.

The most likely trigger for a fall in China's capex is weakening exports. They don't even have to stagnate to trigger real problems, much less fall. When the current investment pattern is predicated on rapid and continuous growth, material decline in the growth rate should be sufficient to kick off lower capital spending. An event the magnitude of 1980 would cause a direct hit of 12% of GDP in China in addition to any multiplier effects and that is hardly unthinkable. Keep in mind that exports themselves account for 33% of Chinese GDP so any outright decline there would be a real problem for them - likely triggering a minimum 20% fall of GDP. Frankly it will be difficult for them to avoid it given the economic and political climate in their trading partners.

This would be just the result of inflated current investment combined with a typical cyclical decline in demand overseas. We don't need a replay of the Great Depression for China's economy to suffer horribly. From 1929 to 1932, capital investment in the US economy fell by over 90%. Given the much higher weighting of such spending in China today, the result of such an event would be literally unthinkable.


Dichotomy
You might ask why China's currency is doing so well if their economy is so vulnerable? And that would be a fair question, though we would point out that the Shanghai exchange is down over 50% in less than a year, so some markets are reflecting probable severe damage to the economy. But the answer to the currency issue is the one that we often give - perception lags reality.

It's usually a pretty good bet that the locals will know their market better than those who are far away. This is just common sense. In China, only local buyers can participate on domestic stock exchanges and they have obviously gotten a lot more cautious since the Fall. However, the currency market is subject to outside forces despite the nation's currency controls. Essentially, the locals have started to sell China while the foreigners are still buying. We have long believed that there is a hot money problem in China since their currency reserves have been growing a lot faster than their trade surplus would suggest. In addition, the reported surplus itself looks pretty squirrelly.

The hot money problem has recently been recognized by the government and some of the financial press. Here's an example from the Financial Times:

Given that the inflows far outstrip trade and direct foreign investment, China appears to be receiving vast amounts of speculative "hot money".

The FT article goes on to cite an estimate of $150-$170 billion of hot money flowing into China in the first 5 months of 2008. This money is coming in despite the collapsing stock market and despite the fact that the Yuan is losing domestic purchasing power at a rapid pace - far faster than the currencies the money is coming out of certainly. This is the virtual definition of speculative money flow. The FT continues:

China has two big attractions for foreign investors - interest rates are higher than in the US and the currency is expected to appreciate.

Of course real interest rates in China are hugely negative - 400 basis points or more due to high and rising CPI. This is a far worse situation than in the US or Eurozone. And why is the currency expected to appreciate? Why because everyone THINKS so. Kind of reminds of the tongue-in-cheek description of a celebrity as "some who's famous for being well-known." What it boils down to is herd-animal behavior. The herd is going over there, they must know something. Let's follow them, the grass must be better over there. Mooooooo.

One final clip from the Financial Times:

But government officials also believe that illegal transfers are taking place - through foreign companies declaring that funds are for direct investment and then putting the money in the bank and exporters exaggerating the value of overseas revenues in order to bring in extra funds. (As an aside, economists point out that if fraudulent export receipts really are widely used to bring in hot money, China's politically troublesome trade surplus would actually be much lower than thought.)

Prior to 2005, China's trade surplus never exceeded $50 billion on an annual basis. It hit $100 billion that year and roughly $250 billion in 2007. The dollar peg was dropped in mid-2005 and the surplus began to grow explosively at the same time, soaring through the period of the stock bubble. The monthly surplus peaked in October 2007, the same month as the stock markets did worldwide - including China's. Since the suspected route of the hot money is fraudulent trade or investment deals, we cannot know with certainty but the timing of the flows is highly suspicious.


Suspicions
Here at Financial Jenga, we are automatically suspicious of consensus, orthodoxy or any widely-held belief unless there is strong evidence to support it. The meme of unstoppable growth in China does not meet that test. While that country has many strengths, they appear to already be discounted and then some. The massive imbalances create vulnerabilities and the economy appears to be just as much a bubble as anything in the West - perhaps more so. In this case, the bubble is in factory investment, not housing but tremendous over-supply is already present, with more being created. The Wall Street Journal recently published a front-page article about factories closing down as overseas demand falls and China's manufacturers become uncompetitive due to rising costs. We've already discussed the implications of that scenario. We have long believed that China today is very comparable to Japan 20 years ago and we see nothing to make us change that hypothesis.