For those who haven't seen it already, Berkshire Hathaway agreed to invest $5 billion in Bank of America this morning. The pop in stocks lasted all of 30 minutes.
But I wanted to discuss the last Buffett Bailout - of Goldman and what it may portend. My operating thesis is that WB has morphed into a completely political creature and will only make big, publicized investments for propaganda purposes. That certainly was the case with GS in 2008.
But like any actor, he has to receive something in return for the use of his name and image. That something is a political guarantee for his "investment" and the history of 2008 supports this. Buffett's deal with Goldman was announced before the US market opened on September 23, 2008. But behind the scenes a lot of political moves were being made that he obviously knew about but few others did at the time.
The Fed of course was involved. Over the next few days (through 9/29) they established or increased swaplines with a large number of foreign central banks. In effect they lent out $360 billion to foreign banks. The FDIC closed Wachovia and WaMu - pushing them to merge into the already bloated and insolvent Citibank and JP Morgan respectively. Wells ultimately outbid Citi for Wachovia. The Treasury moved to guarantee all money market funds and the TARP bailout was cooked up as a bill and submitted to the House over the weekend prior to initial rejection on the 29th.
The Bottom Line
My point is this. Last time Buffett was part of a full-court press designed to fool people into investing their earned money right along side his borrowed bank credit. Every lever was pulled by Wall Street and the Government in order to "restore confidence" and as the price of his participation, Buffett was given the privilege of front running virtually every central bank and government policy change.
I expect this time will be no different. The Fed is likely to announce something desperate and stupid tomorrow morning. It will likely be accompanied by something out of the Treasury and/or FDIC shortly thereafter if the Fed move proves insufficient to pump asset prices higher and bail out Warren after he stuck his neck out financially for favorable propaganda effect.
Of course the bad news if you're a bull is that it didn't work in 2008 despite truly extreme measures. Stocks, after a short sharp bounce continued to fall for another 6 months and housing prices merely rebounded slightly before resuming their decline. In 2008, stocks had already been falling for a year and had nearly been cut in half before they got that desperate. This time, we are 3.5 months past the rebound high and six weeks from the secondary peak. We are also only 15% off those highs - not 45% like in 2008.
There is probably a trading opportunity on the long side for the next week or two but I'm not going to get greedy or stupid. History indicates that Buffett is likely front-running SOMETHING here. But it sure as hell isn't fundamentals.
Showing posts with label confidence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label confidence. Show all posts
Thursday, 25 August 2011
Friday, 4 February 2011
(F)Rebasing
Obviously there is a pretty bad discrepancy between those numbers in this morning's edition of blowing sunshine up your skirt from the Ministry of Truth.
current employment report
Given the size of the country, it SHOULD take 600k jobs to move the rate that much so obviously there's a problem here. How did this happen? Dig a bit deeper and you'll see that they simply defined 504k out of the labor force from December to January and rounding did the rest. Wave a wand and define those people out of existence. If they don't exist, they can't be unemployed now can they?
If you look at the chart, you'll see that they did the same thing in December from November. In that case only 260k unemployed people disappeared from the statistics. There is a clear and systemic effort to deceive the public about the state of the economy and it's getting worse.
latest household data
But there's is an even bigger deception in the numbers that helps to reveal the systemic fraud of the numbers. Last month the B(L)S claimed that their establishment survey measured 130,712k employed:
But THIS month they show 130,265k employed and claim that it is an increase of 36k, rather than the massive drop of 447k that it actually is. They did this by altering history. Now, the record shows that 130,229k were working in December and the rest of those people have disappeared down the memory hole. It wouldn't be a concern if the revisions were random but the pattern is very consistent - almost perfectly so. Report good news now and back away later. This is the same game played with corporate earnings to deceive investors. Loudly trumpet "good" current results. Then quietly go back later and revise them down. Then use the revised numbers to show "growth" with the next fraudulent set of numbers.
The B(L)S calls this rebasing. Corporations call it a "one time charge" but it's the same scam. The objective in both cases is to mislead the public. It's nothing more than fraud with the goal of getting the public to buy the hopium of the confidence game. That's why I think that freebasing is a more appropriate name.
current employment report
Given the size of the country, it SHOULD take 600k jobs to move the rate that much so obviously there's a problem here. How did this happen? Dig a bit deeper and you'll see that they simply defined 504k out of the labor force from December to January and rounding did the rest. Wave a wand and define those people out of existence. If they don't exist, they can't be unemployed now can they?
If you look at the chart, you'll see that they did the same thing in December from November. In that case only 260k unemployed people disappeared from the statistics. There is a clear and systemic effort to deceive the public about the state of the economy and it's getting worse.
latest household data
But there's is an even bigger deception in the numbers that helps to reveal the systemic fraud of the numbers. Last month the B(L)S claimed that their establishment survey measured 130,712k employed:
But THIS month they show 130,265k employed and claim that it is an increase of 36k, rather than the massive drop of 447k that it actually is. They did this by altering history. Now, the record shows that 130,229k were working in December and the rest of those people have disappeared down the memory hole. It wouldn't be a concern if the revisions were random but the pattern is very consistent - almost perfectly so. Report good news now and back away later. This is the same game played with corporate earnings to deceive investors. Loudly trumpet "good" current results. Then quietly go back later and revise them down. Then use the revised numbers to show "growth" with the next fraudulent set of numbers.
The B(L)S calls this rebasing. Corporations call it a "one time charge" but it's the same scam. The objective in both cases is to mislead the public. It's nothing more than fraud with the goal of getting the public to buy the hopium of the confidence game. That's why I think that freebasing is a more appropriate name.
Thursday, 10 December 2009
Fractional Naked Shorting
Every dollar-denominated loan can be viewed functionally as a partial naked short position in FRNs (Federal Reserve Notes, 1.e. cash). The extent of the naked short is the inverse of the reserve ratio, so at 10% reserve, the position is written as 90% naked short. The entry is created where the bank shorts notional dollars into existence where none existed before. The Fed is a mechanism for supporting those naked shorts against margin calls that would otherwise happen in the real world - that's what a bank run really is, a margin call by lenders (depositors).
The continued existence of this naked shorting depends utterly on the willingness of the lenders to accept repayment in virtual instead of real dollars. Wire transfers, checks and book entries are all dollar substitutes, not actual dollars. An entire massive infrastructure has been erected to push people towards the conclusion that these are actually identical to FRNs. Banks will freely exchange your book entry with them for cash - until they can't anymore. The FDIC exists to guarantee that you will get cash for that book entry or other cash substitute. The Fed holds stocks of FRNs which it can exchange on a limited basis to commercial banks in danger of running out.
The scale of the pyramid scheme can be measured by the ratio of actual cash to virtual cash. Total cash in circulation (real cash) is $923 billion per the H.4.1 release dated December 10. The amount of virtual cash is the total credit outstanding, which is $52.6 TRILLION as of September 30 per the Z.1 release also dated December 10. In other words, each one dollar of cash is supporting nearly 57 dollars of credit. Through the mechanism of this gigantic naked short position, the value of the underlying security - the US dollar has been driven down to a huge extent. In fact, the short ratio can also be expressed as 98%. Not coincidentally, that is also the extent to which the US dollar's purchasing power has been reduced since the advent of the Federal Reserve.
This gives you some idea of the extent to which the value of the supply of dollars has been diluted by all of the substitutes that have been introduced into the system. If the dollar were a drug, it would be so heavily cut as to have no discernible effect. It also explains the desperation with which the financial world is attempting to save "the system" - by which they mean the machine that issues dollar substitutes and convinces you to accept them. There are sufficient dollars to cover less than 2% of domestic debt outstanding. That takes no account of the naked short positions of foreign banks. The bankers are short 57 dollars for each dollar that actually exists. You can well imagine what would happen if such a short position were to be squeezed to any significant extent.
One can justify banking to the extent than it increases productive capacity and therefore ultimately wealth. The increase in the pool of dollar substitutes will have minimal inflationary impact as that growth will be counter-balanced by an increase in the pool of goods those dollars can buy. This is a social good and one of the few philosophical reasons to support banking. Of course we are long past the point at which such banking was the norm, or even a large minority of credit activity.
The continued existence of this naked shorting depends utterly on the willingness of the lenders to accept repayment in virtual instead of real dollars. Wire transfers, checks and book entries are all dollar substitutes, not actual dollars. An entire massive infrastructure has been erected to push people towards the conclusion that these are actually identical to FRNs. Banks will freely exchange your book entry with them for cash - until they can't anymore. The FDIC exists to guarantee that you will get cash for that book entry or other cash substitute. The Fed holds stocks of FRNs which it can exchange on a limited basis to commercial banks in danger of running out.
The scale of the pyramid scheme can be measured by the ratio of actual cash to virtual cash. Total cash in circulation (real cash) is $923 billion per the H.4.1 release dated December 10. The amount of virtual cash is the total credit outstanding, which is $52.6 TRILLION as of September 30 per the Z.1 release also dated December 10. In other words, each one dollar of cash is supporting nearly 57 dollars of credit. Through the mechanism of this gigantic naked short position, the value of the underlying security - the US dollar has been driven down to a huge extent. In fact, the short ratio can also be expressed as 98%. Not coincidentally, that is also the extent to which the US dollar's purchasing power has been reduced since the advent of the Federal Reserve.
This gives you some idea of the extent to which the value of the supply of dollars has been diluted by all of the substitutes that have been introduced into the system. If the dollar were a drug, it would be so heavily cut as to have no discernible effect. It also explains the desperation with which the financial world is attempting to save "the system" - by which they mean the machine that issues dollar substitutes and convinces you to accept them. There are sufficient dollars to cover less than 2% of domestic debt outstanding. That takes no account of the naked short positions of foreign banks. The bankers are short 57 dollars for each dollar that actually exists. You can well imagine what would happen if such a short position were to be squeezed to any significant extent.
One can justify banking to the extent than it increases productive capacity and therefore ultimately wealth. The increase in the pool of dollar substitutes will have minimal inflationary impact as that growth will be counter-balanced by an increase in the pool of goods those dollars can buy. This is a social good and one of the few philosophical reasons to support banking. Of course we are long past the point at which such banking was the norm, or even a large minority of credit activity.
Thursday, 16 July 2009
The Price of Ponzi
Faking Bank
First let's be clear that prices for the majority of asset classes around the world are unsustainably high. This is an obvious corollary to the very inflated state of the global financial system and economy due to the excessive leverage that we have commented upon many times. It bears repeating that central banks (CBs) have little actual power, they merely serve as rallying points and fetish-totems for optimistic, true-believing speculators. The evidence is quite clear that CBs often fail to accomplish their goals, in recent cases despite extraordinary actions to "inspire confidence" - i.e. reignite speculation.
If the CBs were as powerful as most think, they could not possibly fail to accomplish their goals. Like voodoo, it is the BELIEF of the victim that causes the damage - a negative application of the well-documented placebo effect. While they have succeeded in restarting speculation to some extent in equities and commodities, they have utterly failed to do so in most of the securitization and especially the re-securitization markets. Other than the Fed itself, there is very little demand for MBS and ABS. CDOs have fallen flat on their face and can't get up. The investment bankers' efforts to re-securitize garbage and get it rated as AAA again have largely met with derision. Assets in the real economy are seeing no increase in demand at all to this point. Housing, commercial RE, private businesses, capital equipment and others are all in the doldrums with hardly any positives even in the second derivative.
Flee(t)ing Confidence
Take note of which asset classes are seeing speculation and which are not. It is only those that can be sold instantly with a mouse click that are getting any action - equities and commodities which trade as futures on an exchange. The exceptions are revealing. Iron ore, which requires long-term contracts instead of futures isn't going up and in fact is going down, with users essentially buying at spot by refusing to commit to L-T deals. Assets that are theoretically liquid but actually trade by appointment only are seeing little help. This would include the aforementioned MBS and ABS. Those that require a real commitment and have payback periods measured in years continue to crater. Basically, the only confidence at this time is the confidence of the daytrader.
Yet we now see speculation among economists that there could be a return to growth in the next four quarters and actually, it's hard to disagree that such a thing is technically possible. The key here is the massive amount of deficit spending by governments around the world. Official US Treasury estimates place the FY 2009 deficit at $1.8 trillion but $2 trillion is more likely. The DEFICIT will likely represent 14% of GDP this year. China is in a similar situation, with a "stimulus" package of nearly $600 billion in a $4.4 trillion dollar economy - which works out to just under 14% of GDP. Hmm, that number sounds familiar.
Large segments of both economies are ponzi schemes, though China's most vulnerable sectors are both larger and more leveraged relatively speaking. In the US, the most affected sector is finance; in China, construction and fixed investment. Consider for a moment that both governments are spending enormous sums of money they don't have - effectively borrowing it from the future to spend now. Once again hoping to ignite a chain reaction of speculation and a new bubble.
We actually expect a slight positive print in US GDP in early 2010, with a larger collapse to follow as soon as the government can no longer borrow cheaply. This is the inevitable result of spending twice your income (tax revenue) just to keep the current illusion alive. When the bond market cuts off this foolishness, the portion of the economy that is unsustainable without a bubble dies and all of the capital spent to keep it alive dies with it - a complete waste. Instead of a mere depression, we have a depression compounded with the destruction of capital that should have been preserved to start rebuilding afterwards.
Pricing Ponzi
If you think about it, both the US and China are expending one-seventh of their respective GDPs to support a lie. Another way to think of it is the rate of return the market (in the form of speculators) demands to continue to invest in the ponzi schemes. In effect, the government's best guess at the required RoR is 14%. Antal Fekete has written about the falling marginal productivity of debt. In other words, the debt-based ponzi scheme is becoming less and less effective. As a result the sponsor of the scheme (governments) are having to increase the amount pumped into the bubble to keep the speculators in and prevent a UNIVERSAL recognition of the failure that has already occurred. This is typical of late-stage ponzi schemes where a critical mass of investors become suspicious and demand their money. The sponsor has to come up with it somewhere and in this case they can conveniently pledge their citizens' future income (taxes) as collateral for more loans.
It is impossible to calculate the precise cost but we can look at deficit and "stimulus" spending as a good first approximation of the price to keep the ponzi scheme rolling. If 14% of GDP can be spent and not even produce a single quarter of positive numbers then the decay is even larger and more advanced than we have previously postulated. As an example, the latest Personal Income Report from the BEA showed the scale of government attempts to manipulate the economy. Wages dropped sharply but personal income rose 1.4%. The money quotes:
Once the long-end of the Treasury yield curve resumes its upward march, the financing will get more difficult. If short-term money ever becomes expensive for the US government then the deception is over. But for right now we may get further upticks in optimism as long as the government can continue to create doubt and obscure the real state of the economy. In the near term, it's all in the hands of the speculators and their mood swings and isn't that a sad commentary on the state of the world.
First let's be clear that prices for the majority of asset classes around the world are unsustainably high. This is an obvious corollary to the very inflated state of the global financial system and economy due to the excessive leverage that we have commented upon many times. It bears repeating that central banks (CBs) have little actual power, they merely serve as rallying points and fetish-totems for optimistic, true-believing speculators. The evidence is quite clear that CBs often fail to accomplish their goals, in recent cases despite extraordinary actions to "inspire confidence" - i.e. reignite speculation.
If the CBs were as powerful as most think, they could not possibly fail to accomplish their goals. Like voodoo, it is the BELIEF of the victim that causes the damage - a negative application of the well-documented placebo effect. While they have succeeded in restarting speculation to some extent in equities and commodities, they have utterly failed to do so in most of the securitization and especially the re-securitization markets. Other than the Fed itself, there is very little demand for MBS and ABS. CDOs have fallen flat on their face and can't get up. The investment bankers' efforts to re-securitize garbage and get it rated as AAA again have largely met with derision. Assets in the real economy are seeing no increase in demand at all to this point. Housing, commercial RE, private businesses, capital equipment and others are all in the doldrums with hardly any positives even in the second derivative.
Flee(t)ing Confidence
Take note of which asset classes are seeing speculation and which are not. It is only those that can be sold instantly with a mouse click that are getting any action - equities and commodities which trade as futures on an exchange. The exceptions are revealing. Iron ore, which requires long-term contracts instead of futures isn't going up and in fact is going down, with users essentially buying at spot by refusing to commit to L-T deals. Assets that are theoretically liquid but actually trade by appointment only are seeing little help. This would include the aforementioned MBS and ABS. Those that require a real commitment and have payback periods measured in years continue to crater. Basically, the only confidence at this time is the confidence of the daytrader.
Yet we now see speculation among economists that there could be a return to growth in the next four quarters and actually, it's hard to disagree that such a thing is technically possible. The key here is the massive amount of deficit spending by governments around the world. Official US Treasury estimates place the FY 2009 deficit at $1.8 trillion but $2 trillion is more likely. The DEFICIT will likely represent 14% of GDP this year. China is in a similar situation, with a "stimulus" package of nearly $600 billion in a $4.4 trillion dollar economy - which works out to just under 14% of GDP. Hmm, that number sounds familiar.
Large segments of both economies are ponzi schemes, though China's most vulnerable sectors are both larger and more leveraged relatively speaking. In the US, the most affected sector is finance; in China, construction and fixed investment. Consider for a moment that both governments are spending enormous sums of money they don't have - effectively borrowing it from the future to spend now. Once again hoping to ignite a chain reaction of speculation and a new bubble.
We actually expect a slight positive print in US GDP in early 2010, with a larger collapse to follow as soon as the government can no longer borrow cheaply. This is the inevitable result of spending twice your income (tax revenue) just to keep the current illusion alive. When the bond market cuts off this foolishness, the portion of the economy that is unsustainable without a bubble dies and all of the capital spent to keep it alive dies with it - a complete waste. Instead of a mere depression, we have a depression compounded with the destruction of capital that should have been preserved to start rebuilding afterwards.
Pricing Ponzi
If you think about it, both the US and China are expending one-seventh of their respective GDPs to support a lie. Another way to think of it is the rate of return the market (in the form of speculators) demands to continue to invest in the ponzi schemes. In effect, the government's best guess at the required RoR is 14%. Antal Fekete has written about the falling marginal productivity of debt. In other words, the debt-based ponzi scheme is becoming less and less effective. As a result the sponsor of the scheme (governments) are having to increase the amount pumped into the bubble to keep the speculators in and prevent a UNIVERSAL recognition of the failure that has already occurred. This is typical of late-stage ponzi schemes where a critical mass of investors become suspicious and demand their money. The sponsor has to come up with it somewhere and in this case they can conveniently pledge their citizens' future income (taxes) as collateral for more loans.
It is impossible to calculate the precise cost but we can look at deficit and "stimulus" spending as a good first approximation of the price to keep the ponzi scheme rolling. If 14% of GDP can be spent and not even produce a single quarter of positive numbers then the decay is even larger and more advanced than we have previously postulated. As an example, the latest Personal Income Report from the BEA showed the scale of government attempts to manipulate the economy. Wages dropped sharply but personal income rose 1.4%. The money quotes:
Private wage and salary disbursements decreased $12.4 billion in May, compared with a decrease of $0.7 billion in April.
Personal current transfer receipts increased $162.6 billion in May, compared with an increase of $59.1 billion in April. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provides for one-time payments of $250 to eligible individuals receiving social security, supplemental security income, veterans benefits, and railroad retirement benefits. These benefits boosted the level of personal current transfer receipts by $157.6 billions at an annual rate in May.
Once the long-end of the Treasury yield curve resumes its upward march, the financing will get more difficult. If short-term money ever becomes expensive for the US government then the deception is over. But for right now we may get further upticks in optimism as long as the government can continue to create doubt and obscure the real state of the economy. In the near term, it's all in the hands of the speculators and their mood swings and isn't that a sad commentary on the state of the world.
Friday, 10 July 2009
Great Pyramid of Geezer
An update by Karl Denninger at Market Ticker today got the old synapses firing. Denninger points out that pension plans are in trouble and cites a Wall Street Journal article strongly suggesting accounting fraud in public pension plans. The WSJ says:
Unfortunately, the credulous public has been misled in any number of similar ways. Robert Prechter of Elliott Wave International recently described the process by which banks also shrank the capital supporting their balance sheets to a tiny fraction of what had previously been required and considered prudent:
Sure or Insure
Yet the problems of inadequate capital hardly end there. Like pensions and banks, insurance is another area that succumbed to the ubiquitous optimism of the UDB. Insurance companies became so accustomed to capital appreciation well above the historic norm that they began to take them for granted. Many annuity policies and guaranteed investment contracts were written promising high fixed rates of return based on that experience. This has proven devastating for many insurers, who are now rushing to rewrite such contracts. This is a microcosm for the weak capital position of much of the industry as key asset classes for most life and casualty companies are stocks, bonds and real estate. Like every other leveraged institution out there, the insurers have taken a beating on those assets and their promises to deliver future benefits are increasingly in doubt. Which brings us to a similar structure with the biggest capital shortfall of all.
GovernMENTAL Institutions
For the most part, capital is literally a foreign concept in this sector. Few governments have significant reserves, much less any real capitalization. Except in regions where government-owned enterprises dominate the economy, the primary source of revenue for most institutions is taxes - on the private sector naturally. So instead of actual capital, governments have something even more volatile - a projected future revenue stream. As with every other sector we have examined so far, those projections about the future are subject to the psychological distortions that accompany large-scale financial manias. In an environment of historic extremes like the UDB, those distorted perceptions can easily become fatal. We see that today in the sad case of California - where the state is issuing IOUs because they are out of money. Having accustomed themselves to double-digit annual rises in tax revenue, Sacramento (and other state capitals) simply spent it all. Those projections and plans aren't working out so well anymore.
The US Federal Government is arguably in even worse shape. Borrowing this year is likely to approximately equal tax income. No entity can spend twice its income for long and hope to survive. The remnant optimism of the UDB has settled in one of its last-ditch redoubts: faith in government. In addition to the spending spree, Washington has also embarked on a series of empty promises that would make a serial polygamist blush. Not content to merely guarantee deposits through the FDIC, the Feds now do the same for bank bonds through TLGP. Fannie and Freddie debt is backed thorough a de facto nationalization and money market mutual funds are guaranteed by the Federal Reserve. Many trillions of government "guarantees" are piled atop the roughly $1 trillion of deficit spending for this fiscal year. These promises are lighter than a feather but certainly worth their weight in gold. In other words there is no way Washington can deliver but they are hoping nobody notices and that the empty promises will inspire "confidence" in the economy. Like many other sectors, various levels of government are attempting to cover huge obligations with inadequate resources.
Frankly, it's sad that so many people fail to see the little man behind the curtain putting up the front that is the Great Oz. These large and varied institutions have stretched themselves far too thin and are praying for another bubble to bail them out again. The title of this missive refers to those who will bear the brunt of the damage from our return to reality - those who bought into the promises of these institutional pyramid schemes and don't have the time to recover financially. The frenzy of financial pyramid construction certainly put the Egyptians' little excursion in stonework to shame. In reality, the old truths would have served us well, but like every bubble generation in history, ours has convinced themselves that "this time it's different" when it never really is. Like those who have gone before, we will learn the hard way when two things we all learned as children would have prevented much of this mess:
Last year we warned about the same phenomenon in private sector pensions in Some Key Questions and The Limits of Optimism. In every case the culprit was the same - overly optimistic assumptions about investment returns allowed a financially deficient structure to be sold to key constituencies as safe and sound. The wild optimism that causes managers to overreach like this and causes others to believe their literally incredible assumptions are part and parcel of the Universal Debt Bubble (UDB). Only in such a manic environment can such outlandish claims be regarded as anything other than the fantasies they are in reality. Even worse, a bubble atmosphere makes those assumptions even more dangerous than normal by burdening assets with inflated starting values, making the required price appreciation even less likely than usual. But as long as such tales are believed, a small sliver of capital can be made to support grand promises in the future.Based on their preferred accounting methods -- which discount future liabilities based on high but uncertain returns projected for investments -- these plans are underfunded nationally by around $310 billion.
The numbers are worse using market valuation methods (the methods private-sector plans must use), which discount benefit liabilities at lower interest rates to reflect the chance that the expected returns won't be realized.
Unfortunately, the credulous public has been misled in any number of similar ways. Robert Prechter of Elliott Wave International recently described the process by which banks also shrank the capital supporting their balance sheets to a tiny fraction of what had previously been required and considered prudent:
In the early 1990s, the Federal Reserve Board under Chairman Alan Greenspan took a controversial step and removed banks’ reserve requirements almost entirely.
To do so, it first lowered to zero the reserve requirement on all accounts other than checking accounts. Then it let banks pretend that they have almost no checking account balances by allowing them to
“sweep” those deposits into various savings accounts and money market funds at the end of each business day... The net result is that banks today conveniently meet their nominally required reserves (currently about $45b.) with the cash in their vaults that they need to hold for everyday transactions anyway.
Sure or Insure
Yet the problems of inadequate capital hardly end there. Like pensions and banks, insurance is another area that succumbed to the ubiquitous optimism of the UDB. Insurance companies became so accustomed to capital appreciation well above the historic norm that they began to take them for granted. Many annuity policies and guaranteed investment contracts were written promising high fixed rates of return based on that experience. This has proven devastating for many insurers, who are now rushing to rewrite such contracts. This is a microcosm for the weak capital position of much of the industry as key asset classes for most life and casualty companies are stocks, bonds and real estate. Like every other leveraged institution out there, the insurers have taken a beating on those assets and their promises to deliver future benefits are increasingly in doubt. Which brings us to a similar structure with the biggest capital shortfall of all.
GovernMENTAL Institutions
For the most part, capital is literally a foreign concept in this sector. Few governments have significant reserves, much less any real capitalization. Except in regions where government-owned enterprises dominate the economy, the primary source of revenue for most institutions is taxes - on the private sector naturally. So instead of actual capital, governments have something even more volatile - a projected future revenue stream. As with every other sector we have examined so far, those projections about the future are subject to the psychological distortions that accompany large-scale financial manias. In an environment of historic extremes like the UDB, those distorted perceptions can easily become fatal. We see that today in the sad case of California - where the state is issuing IOUs because they are out of money. Having accustomed themselves to double-digit annual rises in tax revenue, Sacramento (and other state capitals) simply spent it all. Those projections and plans aren't working out so well anymore.
The US Federal Government is arguably in even worse shape. Borrowing this year is likely to approximately equal tax income. No entity can spend twice its income for long and hope to survive. The remnant optimism of the UDB has settled in one of its last-ditch redoubts: faith in government. In addition to the spending spree, Washington has also embarked on a series of empty promises that would make a serial polygamist blush. Not content to merely guarantee deposits through the FDIC, the Feds now do the same for bank bonds through TLGP. Fannie and Freddie debt is backed thorough a de facto nationalization and money market mutual funds are guaranteed by the Federal Reserve. Many trillions of government "guarantees" are piled atop the roughly $1 trillion of deficit spending for this fiscal year. These promises are lighter than a feather but certainly worth their weight in gold. In other words there is no way Washington can deliver but they are hoping nobody notices and that the empty promises will inspire "confidence" in the economy. Like many other sectors, various levels of government are attempting to cover huge obligations with inadequate resources.
Frankly, it's sad that so many people fail to see the little man behind the curtain putting up the front that is the Great Oz. These large and varied institutions have stretched themselves far too thin and are praying for another bubble to bail them out again. The title of this missive refers to those who will bear the brunt of the damage from our return to reality - those who bought into the promises of these institutional pyramid schemes and don't have the time to recover financially. The frenzy of financial pyramid construction certainly put the Egyptians' little excursion in stonework to shame. In reality, the old truths would have served us well, but like every bubble generation in history, ours has convinced themselves that "this time it's different" when it never really is. Like those who have gone before, we will learn the hard way when two things we all learned as children would have prevented much of this mess:
- Never count your chickens before they hatch.
- Save for a rainy day.
It seems so simple and most of us will never forget. With the optimistic assumptions that undergirded the psychology of the UDB evaporating, any program sporting the words insurance or guarantee must be treated with great skepticism.
Saturday, 11 August 2007
Humpty Dumpty Repair
It appears that the CBs have managed to stave of an immediate disaster in the financial markets - at least for the moment. Yet any hope of a material turnaround in market conditions seems distant indeed. The entire system was built on an ever-rising tide of debt and confidence. Debt served to expand the money supply and confidence ensured that the larger pool of money would move through the economy at accelerating velocity.
Now, fears of default have undermined the willingness to lend and borrow - undermining the psychological conditions necessary to sustain debt growth. At the same time, confidence has been crushed, slowing the headlong rush of money around the globe. The sale of CDOs has fallen dramatically - 35% from June to July. These instruments epitomize both trends; they serve to direct capital into new debt deals quickly while simultaneously taking out loans themselves to leverage the profits from those deals.
Confidence has not merely broken, it is shattered. The Fed and other CBs can do nothing to restore this confidence but that hasn't kept them from trying to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. The massive and fully justified loss of confidence has nothing to do with the Fed; it is in the credibility of Wall Street, housing collateral, ratings agencies, credit derivatives and complex financial structures generally. During the boom, the opaque, complex vehicles didn't matter as everything was going up. As things got shaky, the lack of transparency served as a smokescreen to hide the losses and keep the public in the dark.
As the scale of the problem has come to light, trust and confidence in everyone involved has tanked as it should. They have sustained or abetted a fraud against investors and should not be trusted. Given the reluctance to lend, it's clear that many financial institutions don't trust each other. The Fed can flood the markets with credit to temporarily stabilize the system but they can't undo the series of frauds and resulting rational distrust that has spread through the financial world like a virus.
The alphabet soup of complex and opaque credit derivatives helped to hide the damage for a long time. They continue to mask the full extent of the losses and the identity of the losers. But belated recognition by investors has changed the default setting. Previously, they assumed everything was fine unless specific problems were identified. Now, the problems are known if not truly understood, so the assumption is that risk portfolios are in trouble unless proven otherwise. The lack of transparency that was previously helpful is now a gigantic ball and chain.
It can't be undone now. It will take months to find who is holding all of the toxic waste and how much they are holding. Until then, all financial institutions are guilty until proven innocent. Lending will continue to be frozen by the high risk of losses. Humpty Dumpty can't be repaired even by "all the king's horses and all the king's men."
Now, fears of default have undermined the willingness to lend and borrow - undermining the psychological conditions necessary to sustain debt growth. At the same time, confidence has been crushed, slowing the headlong rush of money around the globe. The sale of CDOs has fallen dramatically - 35% from June to July. These instruments epitomize both trends; they serve to direct capital into new debt deals quickly while simultaneously taking out loans themselves to leverage the profits from those deals.
Confidence has not merely broken, it is shattered. The Fed and other CBs can do nothing to restore this confidence but that hasn't kept them from trying to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. The massive and fully justified loss of confidence has nothing to do with the Fed; it is in the credibility of Wall Street, housing collateral, ratings agencies, credit derivatives and complex financial structures generally. During the boom, the opaque, complex vehicles didn't matter as everything was going up. As things got shaky, the lack of transparency served as a smokescreen to hide the losses and keep the public in the dark.
As the scale of the problem has come to light, trust and confidence in everyone involved has tanked as it should. They have sustained or abetted a fraud against investors and should not be trusted. Given the reluctance to lend, it's clear that many financial institutions don't trust each other. The Fed can flood the markets with credit to temporarily stabilize the system but they can't undo the series of frauds and resulting rational distrust that has spread through the financial world like a virus.
The alphabet soup of complex and opaque credit derivatives helped to hide the damage for a long time. They continue to mask the full extent of the losses and the identity of the losers. But belated recognition by investors has changed the default setting. Previously, they assumed everything was fine unless specific problems were identified. Now, the problems are known if not truly understood, so the assumption is that risk portfolios are in trouble unless proven otherwise. The lack of transparency that was previously helpful is now a gigantic ball and chain.
It can't be undone now. It will take months to find who is holding all of the toxic waste and how much they are holding. Until then, all financial institutions are guilty until proven innocent. Lending will continue to be frozen by the high risk of losses. Humpty Dumpty can't be repaired even by "all the king's horses and all the king's men."
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)